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The welfare effects of trade shocks depend crucially on the nature and magnitude of the costs workers
face in moving between sectors. The existing trade literature does not directly address this, assuming
perfect mobility or complete immobility, or adopting reduced-form approaches to estimation. We present
a model of dynamic labor adjustment that does, and which is, moreover, consistent with a key empirical
fact: that intersectoral gross flows greatly exceed net flows. Using an Euler-type equilibrium condition,
we estimate the mean and the variance of workers' switching costs from the U.S. March Current Population
Surveys.  We estimate high values of both parameters, implying both slow adjustment of the economy,
and sharp movements in wages, in response to a trade shock. Simulations of a trade liberalization indicate
that despite the high estimated adjustment cost, in terms of lifetime welfare, the liberalization is Pareto-improving.
The explanation for this surprising finding -- which would be missed by a reduced-form approach
-- is that the high variance to costs ensures high rates of gross flow; this helps spread the liberalization's
benefits around.
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Perhaps the most urgent question facing trade economists is the eﬀect of liberalization
and other trade shocks on the welfare of workers. This question has generated a large
body of research, but a feature shared by most of the extant trade literature on this
is a reliance on static models, in which workers are assumed to be either instantly
costlessly mobile, or perfectly immobile (we will discuss important exceptions below).
This prevents the trade literature from even addressing, let alone answering, some
central questions: What are the costs faced by workers who wish to move to a new
industry in response to import competition? How long will the labor market take
to adjust, and ﬁnd its new steady state? Will that steady state feature a lasting
diﬀerential impact on workers in the import-aﬄlicted sector, or will arbitrage equalize
worker returns in the long run? What are the lifetime welfare eﬀects on workers in
diﬀerent industries, taking into account moving costs and transitional dynamics?
This paper oﬀers an approach to answering these questions. Within the context
of a standard trade model, we specify a dynamic equilibrium model of costly labor
adjustment, a model fully studied in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007). We
then show how the structural moving-cost parameters of this model can be estimated,
using Euler-equation-type techniques borrowed from macroeconomics. Estimating
these parameters on data from the US Current Population Surveys (CPS), we then use
these parameters to simulate stylized trade shocks and show their dynamic equilibrium
impact.
A large number of studies in the trade economics ﬁeld have attempted to mea-
sure the eﬀects of trade shocks on wages. Some test labor-market predictions of the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, as Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). Others regress changes
in wages sector-by-sector on changes in import prices (as Revenga (1992)), trade pol-
icy (as Pavcnik, Goldberg and Attanasio (2004)) or import penetration (as Kletzer
(2002)). Slaughter (1998) provides an overview.
Much has been learned from this literature, but it suﬀers from three weaknesses
that this study addresses directly. First, these all suﬀer from the Lucas critique; for
example, the change in wages observed when a tariﬀ falls may be diﬀerent depending
on whether or not it was anticipated, or whether or not it is expected to be part
of a continuing reduction. Reduced-form regressions cannot accommodate such dis-
2tinctions. Second, in a dynamic environment, wage changes at a given moment are
insuﬃcient for identifying the lifetime eﬀect on a workers’ utility, which is what really
matters for welfare analysis. Third, perhaps most importantly, these reduced-form
studies take no account of the constant inter-industry gross ﬂows of workers observed
in the data. In the data, such gross ﬂows are large, and have a large eﬀect on welfare
calculations. Indeed, we will see that the conclusions one would draw from standard
reduced-form regression results can be reversed when gross ﬂows are accounted for.
A small number of studies in the trade literature do study the empirics of dy-
namic labor market adjustment, but focus on employer-side adjustment. Utar (2007)
estimates a dynamic model of ﬁrm adjustment to trade shocks with heterogeneous
ﬁrms. Robertson and Dutkowsky (2002) use an Euler equation approach to estimate
employers’ labor adjustment costs in Mexico with a focus on international policy but
employs a model that rules out gross ﬂows in excess of net ﬂows, thus ruling out an
important feature of the data that is central to our approach.
On the other hand, a number of labor economists have developed highly sophis-
ticated structural empirical models that allow them to estimate the impact of policy
changes on labor adjustment in a manner similar in some respects to what we are
doing here. Examples include Lee (2005) and Keane and Wolpin (1997), who focus
on occupational choices of workers rather than inter-industry reallocation, and Ken-
nan and Walker (2003), who study movement of workers across US regions. There
are four key diﬀerences between those studies and our approach. First, with our
emphasis on intersectoral reallocation we are tailoring our model to the analysis of
trade policy, which cannot be addressed by those other studies. Second, with our
Euler-equation approach, which appears not to have been used before in the analysis
of workers’ mobility choices, we do not need to make any strong assumptions about
what workers know about the future (in particular, they do not need to know the fu-
ture course of aggregate events with certainty, which is assumed in Keane and Wolpin
(1997) and Lee (2005), for example). We assume that workers have rational expec-
tations about the future, but we need to make no assumption regarding how much
information they have about the future. Third, our estimation method is simple and
computationally cheap, allowing its application potentially to a very wide range of
data sets. The most closely related paper to ours is Artu¸ c (2006), which does esti-
3mate a general-equilibrium structural model of worker response to trade shocks, but
focuses on intergenerational distributional issues and does not use an Euler-equation
approach.1
In our approach, we present a dynamic rational-expectations model2 in which each
worker can choose to move from her current industry to another one in each period,
but must pay a cost to do so. The cost has a common component, which does not
vary across time or workers; and a time-varying idiosyncratic component, which can
be negative, reﬂecting non-pecuniary motives that workers often have for changing
jobs (such as tedium, a need to relocate for family reasons, and the like). We derive
an equilibrium condition, which is a kind of Euler equation, estimate its parameters
using the Current Population Survey (CPS), and simulate a trade liberalization to
illustrate their implications.
The element of idiosyncratic shocks is crucial to a realistic treatment of worker
mobility, for two reasons. First, gross ﬂows are an order of magnitude larger than
net ﬂows, implying large numbers of workers moving in opposite directions at the
same time. Second, Bowlus and Newmann (2006) show that a signiﬁcant fraction of
workers who change jobs voluntarily move to jobs which pay less than the job the
worker left behind. Approximately 40% of voluntary job changes have this feature,
not very diﬀerent from the 50% that would be expected if wage diﬀerences had no
eﬀect on mobility decisions. Both of these observations suggest a central role for
idiosyncratic shocks in worker mobility. We quantify this in our estimates, and show
that it is very important for evaluating the welfare eﬀects of trade policy. In particular,
the presence of these shocks imply that option value is an important element of each
worker’s utility calculation, which, although it can have a decisive eﬀect on the welfare
1Another related paper, Kambourov (2006), calibrates a model of labor reallocation, which is
costly because of sector-speciﬁc human capital and ﬁring costs, and applies it to trade reform. It
turns out that ﬁring costs have a large negative eﬀect on the gains from trade reform. Unlike our
paper, Kambourov’s model does not provide workers with idiosyncratic shocks, so it cannot generate
gross ﬂows in excess of net ﬂows. Given the importance of gross ﬂows in the data, this is a signiﬁcant
feature of our approach.
2The model we use is presented in full in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007). It is a
full-employment model with moving costs for workers. An alternative approach would be to focus
on search frictions, as in Hosios (1990), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) and Davidson and
Matusz (2001).
4eﬀects of trade reform, to our knowledge has never before been introduced into the
literature on trade and labor.
The estimates we obtain show very high average moving costs, and a very high
standard deviation of moving costs, both estimated to be several times average an-
nual wages for moving from one broadly aggregated sector of the economy to another.
These surprisingly high estimated costs are actually in line with related ﬁndings by
other authors using diﬀerent techniques; for example, Kennan and Walker’s (2003)
estimates of costs of moving between US regions, and Artu¸ c’s (2006) estimates of
intersectoral moving costs.3 In addition, as we will see, simulations based on these
patterns produce realistic aggregate behavior. The message conveyed by these ﬁnd-
ings is that US workers change industry a great deal, but those movements do not
respond much to movements in intersectoral wage diﬀerentials. Thus, non-pecuniary
motives such as are captured by our idiosyncratic shocks must be driving a large
portion of our workers’ movements. This is important for the analysis of trade lib-
eralization, as our simulations reveal. First, it suggests sluggish adjustment of the
labor market to a trade shock, with the economy requiring several years to approach
the new steady state. Second, as a corollary, it implies a large drop in wages in the
import-competing sector that is hit by the liberalization; indeed, the wages in that
sector never fully recover. Third, surprisingly, because of the high levels of mobil-
ity due to idiosyncratic shocks, workers in the import-competing sector beneﬁt from
the liberalization. Their welfare rises because the high volatility of their idiosyncratic
shocks combined with rising real wages in other sectors implies that their option value
is enhanced by the liberalization, and this eﬀect overwhelms the direct loss from the
lower wages in their own sector.4 This shows the utility of a dynamic structural
approach; a reduced-form wage equation would have, in this case, produced exactly
3It should be noted that this is so even though Artu¸ c (2006) uses a diﬀerent data set, namely the
NLSY; this paper uses the CPS.
4This is closely related to the empirical ﬁndings of Magee, Davisdon and Matusz (2005). They
ﬁnd, for low-turnover industries, that political action committees are much more likely to donate
to pro-trade politicians if they represent an export sector than an import-competing sector; but
for high-turnover sectors the diﬀerence between export and import-competing industries essentially
disappears. They rationalize this using a search model of labor adjustment as in Hosios (1990) and
Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999), but the underlying reason is similar: With a high degree of
labor ﬂows, workers do not identify closely with the industry in which they are currently located.
5the wrong welfare conclusion by showing wage losses for the import-competing sector
without identifying the countervailing option-value eﬀect. Indeed, in our simulation
section we will show how some of our ﬁndings are superﬁcially similar to results from
the static, reduced-form regressions of Revenga (1992), but with the opposite welfare
implications.
In the following sections we present the model, deriving its estimating equation
and explaining the identiﬁcation strategy intuitively; then examine the data and its
measurement issues; then present our estimates and interpret them. The next section
deals with a number of measurement and speciﬁcation issues, and a ﬁnal section
studies simulations based on our estimated parameters.
2 The model.
Consider an economy in which production may occur in any of N industries. We con-
struct a dynamic rational expectations model of labor mobility across these industries,
in which our goal is to derive an equilibrium condition that will allow estimation of
moving cost parameters.5
2.1 Basic setup
Assume that in each industry i there are a large number of competitive employers,




t denotes the labor used in industry i in period t, and st is a state variable
that could capture the eﬀects of policy (such as trade protection, which might raise
the price of the output), technology shocks, and the like. Assume that Xi is strictly
increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in its ﬁrst argument. Its ﬁrst
derivative with respect to labor is then a continuous, decreasing function of labor,
holding st constant; this is, then, the demand curve for labor in the industry. Assume
5In principle, the model can accommodate geographic as well as inter-industry mobility. Instead
of N industries, we could have N industry-region cells, for example; all of the logic below would carry
through without amendment. In practice, we have limited the discussion to inter-industry mobility
because we have not found enough inter-regional mobility in the data to identify the parameters of
interest.
6that s follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process on some state space S.
The economy’s workers form a continuum of measure L. Each worker at any
moment is located in one of the N industries. Denote the number of workers in
industry i at the beginning of period t by Li
t. If a worker, say, l ∈ [0,L], is in industry
i at the beginning of t, she will produce in that industry, collect the market wage wi
t
for that industry, and then may move to any other industry. In order for the labor





t at all times.
If worker l moves from industry i to industry j, she incurs a cost Cij ≥ 0, which is
the same for all workers and all periods, and is publicly known. In addition, if she is
in industry i at the end of period t, she collects an idiosyncratic beneﬁt εi
l,t from being
in that industry. These beneﬁts are independently and identically distributed across
individuals, industries, and dates, with density function f : < 7−→ <+and cumulative
distribution function F : < 7−→ [0,1]. Thus, the full cost for worker l of moving from
i to j can be thought of as εi
l,t − ε
j
l,t + Cij. The worker knows the values of the εi
l,t
for all i before making the period-t moving decision.6 We adopt the convention that
Cii = 0 for all i.
Note that the mean cost of moving from i to j is given by Cij, but its variance and
other moments are determined by f. It should be emphasized that these higher mo-
ments are important both for estimation and for policy analysis, as will be discussed
below.
All agents have rational expectations and a common constant discount factor
β < 1, and are risk neutral.
An equilibrium then takes the form of a decision rule by which, in each period,
each worker will decide whether to stay in her industry or move to another, based on
the current allocation vector L of labor across industries, the current aggregate state
s, and that worker’s own vector ε of shocks. In the aggregate, this decision rule will
generate a law of motion for the evolution of the labor allocation, and hence (by the
labor market clearing condition just mentioned) for the wage in each industry. Given
this behaviour for wages, the decision rule must be optimal for each worker, in the
sense of maximizing her expected present discounted value of wages plus idiosyncratic
6It is useful to think of the timeline as follows: The worker observes st at the beginning of the
period, produces output and receives the wage, then learns the vector εl,t and decides whether or
not to move. At the end of the period, she enjoys ε
j
l,t in whichever sector j she has landed.
7beneﬁts, net of moving costs.
2.2 The key equilibrium condition.
Suppose that we have somehow computed the maximized value to each worker of
being in industry i when the labor allocation is L and the state is s. Let Ui(L,s,ε)
denote this value, which, of course, depends on the worker’s realized idiosyncratic
shocks. Denote by V i(L,s) the average of Ui(L,s,ε) across all workers, or in other
words, the expectation of Ui(L,s,ε) with respect to the vector ε. Thus, V i(L,s) can
also be interpreted as the expected value of being in industry i, conditional on L and
s, but before the worker learns her value of ε.
Assuming optimizing behavior, i.e., that a worker in industry i will choose to
remain at or move to the industry j that oﬀers her the greatest expected beneﬁts,




























Note that Lt+1 is the next-period allocation of labor, derived from Lt and the decision
rule, and st+1 is the next-period value of the state, which is a random variable whose
distribution is determined by st. The expectations in (1) and (2) are taken with
respect to st+1, conditional on all information available at time t.

































The average value to being in industry i can therefore be decomposed into three terms:
(1) the wage, wi
t, that a industry-i worker receives; (2) the base value of staying on in
7From here on, we drop the worker-speciﬁc subscript, l.
8industry i, i.e., βEt[V i(Lt+1,st+1)]; and (3) the additional value, Ω(εi
t), derived from
having the option to move to another industry should prospects there look better
(and which is simply equal to the expectation of maxj{εj + ε
ij
t } with respect to the
ε vector). We will call this the ‘option value’ associated with being in that industry
at that time.




































t is the value of εi−εj at which a worker in industry i is indiﬀerent between
moving to industry j and staying in i. Condition (5) thus has the simple, common-
sense interpretation that for the marginal mover from i to j, the cost (including the
idiosyncratic component) of moving is equal to the expected future beneﬁt of being
in j instead of i at time t + 1. This expected future beneﬁt has three components.
The ﬁrst is the wage diﬀerential. The second is the revealed expected value to being
in industry j instead of i at time t+2, as revealed by the cost borne by the marginal
mover from i to j at time t+1, or Cij +ε
ij
t+1. The last component is the diﬀerence in
option values associated with being in each industry. Thus, if I contemplate being in
j instead of i next period, I take into account the expected diﬀerence in wages; then
the diﬀerence in the expected values of continuing in each industry afterward; and
ﬁnally, the diﬀerences in the values of the option to leave each industry if conditions
call for it.
Put diﬀerently, condition (5) is an Euler equation. Given appropriate choice of
functional forms, this can be implemented to estimate the moving-cost parameters.
We turn to that task next.
2.3 The estimating equation.
Let m
ij
t be the fraction of the labor force in industry i at time t that chooses to move
to industry j, i.e., the gross ﬂow from i to j. With the assumption of a continuum of
9workers and i.i.d idiosyncratic components to moving costs, this gross ﬂow is simply
the probability that industry j is the best for a randomly selected i-worker. Now,
make the following functional form assumption. Assume that the idiosyncratic shocks



















(For further properties of the extreme-value distribution, see Patel, Kapadia, and
Owen (1976).)
Note that while we make the natural assumption that the ε’s be mean-zero, we
do not impose any restrictions on the variance. The variance is proportional to the
square of ν, which is a free parameter to be estimated, and crucial for all of the policy
and welfare analysis.
By assuming that the εi
t are generated from an extreme-value distribution we are
able to obtain a particularly simple expression for the conditional moment restriction,
which we then plan to estimate using aggregate data. Speciﬁcally, it is shown in the
















t) = −ν lnm
ii
t (7)
Both these expressions make intuitive sense. The ﬁrst says that the greater the
expected net (of moving costs) beneﬁts of moving to j, the larger should be the
observed ratio of movers (from i to j) to stayers. Moreover, holding constant the
10(average) expected net beneﬁts of moving, the higher the variance of the idiosyncratic
cost shocks, the lower the compensating migratory ﬂows.
The second expression says that the greater the probability of remaining in indus-
try i, the lower the value of having the option to move from industry i.8 Moreover,
as the variance of the idiosyncratic component of moving costs increases, so too does
the value of having the option to move. This also makes good sense.















































where µt+1 is news revealed at time t + 1, so that Etµt+1 ≡ 0. In other words, the
parameters of interest, Cij, β and ν, can then be estimated by regressing current ﬂows
(as measured by (lnm
ij
t −lnmii





and the future wage diﬀerential with an intercept. Of course, the disturbance term,
µt+1, will in general be correlated with the regressors, requiring instrumental variables.
The theory implies that past values of the ﬂows and wages will be valid instruments,
and the optimal weighting scheme can be derived as in the Generalized Method of
Moment (GMM) (Hansen (1982)). Note that while our choice of f obviously deter-
mined the form of the estimating equation, under the GMM estimation procedure,




It may be helpful to review how the model provides a strategy for identifying the
parameters of interest to us. Roughly, the logic of the model tells us that the level
of gross ﬂows in the data helps us pin down the ratio of average moving costs to the
8Note that 0 < mii
t < 1, so Ω(εi
t) = −ν lnmii
t > 0.
11variance of moving costs (that is, the ratios of the Cij’s to ν), and the responsiveness
of labor ﬂows to anticipated wage diﬀerentials pins down the level of ν. Essentially,
both the overall level of gross ﬂows and their responsiveness to wages together pin





This is derived from the properties of the extreme-value distribution, and is es-
sentially the same as the outcome of the familiar extreme-value multinomial choice
problem (a detailed deriviation is presented in the appendix). Now consider a sim-
pliﬁed version of the model in which labor demand in each industry is identical and
non-stochastic, and Cij ≡ C∀i 6= j. In the steady state of such a model, Li = Lj and








Thus, the level of steady-state gross ﬂows is a decreasing function of C/ν. This
is easy to understand, as a rise in C raises costs of changing industries, discouraging
mobility, and a rise in ν fattens the tails of the idiosyncratic shocks, increasing the
probability that a given worker has an idiosyncratic moving cost below the thresh-
old required to move. (Or, viewed diﬀerently, a rise in ν raises the importance of
non-pecuniary factors in mobility decisions, making workers more likely to change
industries for non-pecuniary reasons.)
Thus, in this simpliﬁed model, observing what fraction of workers change their
industry per period allows us to pin down the ratio C/ν. Note that in our estimation
equation (9) this ratio is proportional to the intercept, so that a general increase in
gross ﬂows in the data (for given β) will result in lower values for the Cij/ν ratios.
This can be illustrated with Figure 1. A high value of observed ﬂows would imply
12a ray in C,ν space with a low slope, such as OA, while a lower value of gross ﬂows
would imply a point on a ray with a higher slope, such as OB. Now, what identiﬁes
the point upon that ray that the true parameter values must occupy?
Note from (9) that the coeﬃcient multiplying the next-period wage diﬀerential
is β/ν. A straightforward interpretation of this is that the coeﬃcient β/ν measures




t ). Thus, holding β constant, if future wage diﬀerentials are a
good predictor for current labor ﬂows, then we will obtain a low estimate for ν. This
can be understood in two ways. First, realize that a high value of ν means that
idiosyncratic and non-pecuniary factors are dominant in workers’ mobility decisions,
so that workers do not pay much attention to wages when making those decisions.
Thus, a high value of ν implies that wages will be relatively irrelevant as a determinant
of labor ﬂows. A second interpretation is in terms of elasticities of labor supply: If we
think of a labor supply model in which workers have individual disutilities to work and
will join the labor force only if the wage exceeds the disutility, then a high variance of
that disutility in the population of potential workers implies a vertical labor-supply
curve and a low elasticity of supply, so that the wage has a small eﬀect on the amount
of aggregate labor supplied. This is analogous to the eﬀect observed in our model,
but in a setting of dynamic, intersectoral labor supply: A high idiosyncratic variance
implies a low elasticity of response to wages.
Thus, roughly, the overall level of gross ﬂows pins down the C/ν ratio, and the
level of responsiveness of labor ﬂows to future wage diﬀerentials pins down the level
of C and ν. For a given level of ﬂows, if wages do not matter much for explaining
variation in ﬂows over time, a high value of both C and ν will be implied.
A note on measurement error may be appropriate here, as well. If systematic errors
in coding of workers’ industry are present so that spurious industry mobility occurs in
the data, that will both put the parameters on a lower ray (by putting excess mobility
into the data) and put them on a higher point along that ray (by making wages appear
less relevant to mobility, since coding errors are likely uncorrelated with anticipated
wages). Thus, coding errors can in principal result in over- or underestimates of C,
but will deﬁnitely provide an overestimate of ν and an underestimate of the ratio
C/ν.
133 Data.
Our estimation strategy hinges on observing aggregate gross ﬂows across industries.
Since there are no published data on gross ﬂows, we construct gross ﬂow measures
from individual-level data. For this purpose, we use the US Census Bureau’s March
Current Population Surveys (CPS). Each year, the March CPS provides information
on the individual’s industry, occupation, and employment status at the time of the
March interview, as well as the industry, occupation, and employment status in which
the individual spent the most time during the previous calendar year (i.e., January to
December). We use this information to construct rates of ﬂow, m
ij
t−1 for each date t.
We also obtain industry wages wi
t as the average wage reported in the CPS samples for
industry i at date t. These are deﬂated by the CPI, and normalized so that over the
whole sample the average annualized wage is equal to unity. We restrict the sample
to males aged 25 to 64 currently working full time who worked at least 26 weeks in
the previous year and whose most recent weekly income was between $50 and $5,000.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Gross Flows, 1975-2000.
Agric/Min Const Manuf Trans/Util Trade Service
Agric/Min 0.9292 0.0126 0.0142 0.0075 0.0160 0.0206
(0.0146) (0.0040) (0.0046) (0.0032) (0.0063) (0.0057)
Const 0.0056 0.9432 0.0139 0.0063 0.0119 0.0191
(0.0028) (0.0108) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0040)
Manuf 0.0020 0.0041 0.9708 0.0031 0.0080 0.0120
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0035) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0021)
Trans/Util 0.0025 0.0044 0.0068 0.9643 0.0081 0.0138
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0050) (0.0023) (0.0033)
Trade 0.0030 0.0061 0.0135 0.0055 0.9469 0.0250
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0073) (0.0036)
Service 0.0018 0.0043 0.0079 0.0037 0.0103 0.9720
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0033)
(Origin sector is listed by row, destination sector by column. Each cell of table
contains mean ﬂow rate followed by standard deviation in parentheses.)
14If we have n industries, then there are n2 rates of gross ﬂow to keep track of
each period (or n(n−1) if one excludes the fraction of workers in each industry who
do not move). Thus, the number of directions for gross ﬂows proliferates rapidly as
the number of industries increases, leading in ﬁnite samples to zero observations and
observations with very small numbers of individuals. As a result, we need to aggregate
industries, and we aggregate to the following six: 1. Agriculture and Mining; 2.
Construction; 3. Manufacturing; 4. Transportation, Communication, and Utilities;
5. Trade; and 6. All Other Services including government. As a result of this
aggregation, the sample size for each regression is 720, since we have 26 years minus
2 to allow for lags, and 6 times 5 directions of ﬂows.














Agric/Min 34,739 24,978 0.8374 0.6021 20,952
Const 38,432 21,623 0.9265 0.5213 44,943
Manuf 42,655 21,706 1.0283 0.5233 140,339
Trans/Util 43,608 20,552 1.0512 0.4954 55,699
Trade 37,024 23,288 0.8925 0.5614 83,833
Service 43,617 26,810 1.0514 0.6463 173,012
An additional issue with the CPS is imputed data. In the CPS interviews, if an
answer to a particular question is not received or is inconsistent with other answers,
a variety of complex procedures are followed to impute the missing or inconsistent
information (see Current Population Survey (2002), chapter 9, for a lengthy sum-
mary). As Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) point out, the imputation procedures
changed in 1976 and 1989, and at those dates, rates of gross ﬂow across industries
and occupations in the publicly released CPS data changed dramatically. In par-
ticular, apparent rates of gross ﬂow dropped dramatically with the 1976 change in
15imputation procedures, and they increased dramatically with the 1989 change. Rates
of gross ﬂow are central to our estimation strategy, so we need to obtain the most
reliable measures for such ﬂows possible, and if imputation procedures introduce spu-
rious ﬂows we need to ﬁnd a way to cleanse the data of these eﬀects. From 1989 on,
an indicator variable is recorded in the data to indicate if a portion of a given data
record has been imputed. We follow Moscarini and Vella (2003), and perform the
following two steps to minimize the imputation problem: (i) We drop data prior to
1976 (for which Moscarini and Vella argue that the imputation procedures were very
crude and introduced a great deal of spurious gross ﬂows, and no indicator exists in
the data to identify which records are aﬀected by imputation); and (ii) We drop any
individual subsequent to 1988 whose data are partially imputed. In principle, this
could create a selection bias, but since the sample means for the individuals who have
been dropped are very similar to those for the rest of the sample (except for gross
ﬂow rates, which are much higher for the dropped workers), it does not appear to be
a problem in this case.
Descriptive statistics for the resulting data are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Sample
sizes added up across years range from 20,952 for Agriculture/Mining to 140,339 for
Manufacturing and 173,012 for Service. Table 1 summarizes gross ﬂows. Each cell of
the table shows the average fraction of workers in the row sector who moved to the
column sector in any given period; for example, on average, 0.56% of Construction
workers in any year moved to Agriculture/Mining. The main diagonal shows the
average fraction who did not change sector of employment (that is, mii
t ), so one
minus this value is a simple measure of the rate of gross ﬂow. The value on the
diagonal varies from 0.9292 for Agriculture/Mining to 0.9720 for Services, implying
a rate of gross ﬂow that varies across sectors from 2.8% to 7.1%. Table 2 shows
descriptive statistics for wages. Normalized wages (that is, normalized to have a unit
mean) averaged across time range from 0.8374 for Agriculture/Mining to 1.0514 for
Services.
164 Results.
Before showing estimations, we should point out that we do not attempt to estimate
β. This model is not designed to estimate rates of time preference, and although it
could be done in principle, in practice it turns out that that one parameter is very
poorly identiﬁed. Since it is not a parameter of interest for us, and since it is the one
parameter for which we have strong information a priori, we simply impose β = 0.97
in all that follows.
Table 3 shows the results from the basic regression. For the simplest implemen-
tation of the model, we impose Cij ≡ C∀i 6= j, so that the mean moving cost for any
transition from one industry to any other is the same. We will explore speciﬁcations
that allow the Cij’s to vary shortly. Throughout the table, the data are from 1976 to
2001, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Panel I shows the results for the full sample with no instruments, which (recalling
(8))amounts to regressing current ﬂows lnm
ij
t −lnmii




and the future wage diﬀerential w
j
t+1 − wi
t+1 by OLS. Of course, this is likely to be
biassed, as the residual contains the shock revealed at time t + 1, which is likely to
be correlated with date-t+1 wages. For this reason, we use as instrumental variables
the values of the gross ﬂows and wages lagged twice, which must be uncorrelated with
any new information revealed at time t + 1. The estimates using the instrumental
values are reported in Panel II. Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, all estimates use
this instrumental-variables approach.
For the basic speciﬁcation, estimation with and without instrumental variables
produces extremely high estimates of both C and ν, with both parameters highly
signiﬁcant. The instrumental-variables estimate of C in Panel II amounts to ap-
proximately thirteen times average annual wage earnings (given our normalization of
average wages to unity). The value of ν of 2.897 implies a variance of the idiosyncratic
shock equal to 13.8, or a standard deviation of 3.7; of course, the standard deviation
of the idiosyncratic moving cost is twice that (since it is the diﬀerence between two
idiosyncratic shocks). In other words, the mean moving cost between two industries
is thirteen times the average wage, but its standard deviation is about seven times
the average wage. We will argue in the following section that these estimates are
likely to be biassed upward and we will present lower estimates following corrections
17Table 3: The Basic Regression.
I. Full sample: OLS
ν C
4.466** (1.829) 22.065 (1.780)**
II. Full sample with instruments.
ν C
2.897*** (2.667) 13.210*** (2.558)
III. Younger workers.
ν C
2.385*** (2.346) 10.312** (2.228)
IV. Older workers.
ν C
4.220 (1.153) 21.508 (1.149)
V. No college education.
ν C
5.665 (0.946) 25.658 (0.922)
VI. Some college education.
ν C
3.339** (2.000) 15.539** (1.785)
(T-statistics are in parentheses. One-sided signiﬁcance: 1-percent***, 5-percent**,
10-percent*.)
18for the bias, but these strikingly high ﬁgures do convey an important message that is
robust to all corrections: Labor movements in response to a diﬀerential in wages are
very sluggish. The labor market acts as if it is very costly to change sectors, but at
the same time a signiﬁcant number of workers does so anyway, not in response to dif-
ferences in wages, but because of unobserved and possibly non-pecuniary factors that
are at least as important as wages in workers’ decisions. Later, in the simulations, we
will see that the aggregate labor market behavior implied by our estimates is quite
realistic, and ﬁts well with some reduced-form regression results in the literature.
Panels III and IV show the results when the estimation is restricted to workers
under the age of 45 and workers 45 years old or older, respectively. Once again,
the coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence in results is that the mean and
variance of moving costs are substantially higher for older workers (the value of C
is about twice as high for the older workers), although it must be noted that the
parameters are very imprecisely estimated for the older workers.9 This does not
reﬂect a substantially reduced mobility per se for older workers (the ratio C/ν is
about 5.1 for older workers and 4.3 for younger workers), but rather a much lower
responsiveness of mobility to wage diﬀerentials.
Panels V and VI show the results when the estimation is restricted to workers
with no college education and those with at least one year of college, respectively.10
Again, the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, although with a much lower level for those with
no college. Again, the level of mobility per se is not very diﬀerent between the two
groups (the C/ν ratio is about 4.5 for both groups), but estimated mobility barriers
are very much higher for those with no college.
5 Possible sources of bias.
There are two notable reasons the very high estimates we have obtained for C and
ν may be the result of bias: Sampling error in industry wages and possible misinter-
9This may well reﬂect sample sizes, leading to more noise in the measured wages and gross ﬂows
for older workers. There are 518,778 worker-year observations in the sample, of whom 326,918 are
young (63% of the total) and 191,860 are older (37% of the total).
10Workers with some college education comprise 149,329 worker years, or 29% of the total. Workers
with no college comprise 369,449 worker years, or 71% of the total.
19pretation of mobility rates in the CPS data due to timing issues. There is also the
possibility that constraining all Cij values to the the same is a mispeciﬁcation that
generates its own bias. We discuss these in turn.
5.1 Sampling error in wages.
We measure the industry wages wi
t as the average wage in the industry in the CPS
sample. If the sampling error is signiﬁcant, the industry wage will be measured with
noise, resulting in a classical errors-in-variables bias. Given the estimating equation
(9), this will lower the estimated value
β
ν, thus raising the estimated value of ν and
thus C. We investigate this possibility in two ways.
First, we re-do the estimation using time-averaged values of the variables. To
the extent that the high estimates are driven by serially uncorrelated noise in the
measured variables, this should reduce their level. We break the sample into consec-
utive, non-overlapping ﬁve-year segments. For each industry i, we average wi
t over
each segment, and for each i and j we average m
ij
t over the segment. The results are
reported in Table 4.
Note that although the estimated moving costs are much smaller now, nonetheless
C is estimated at eight and a half times average wages and the standard deviation
of moving costs equal to eight times annual wages in the benchmark speciﬁcation of
panel II. (They are also much more precisely estimated, with signiﬁcance at the 1%
level for all parameters.) This speciﬁcation is not useful for policy analysis, since
the implied ﬁve-year period for each worker reallocation is unrealistically long, but it
does make the point that only a portion of the explanation for the high moving costs
could plausibly be due to sampling error in wages.
Second, we re-do the regression using wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics’ Current Employment Surveys (CES) in place of the wage data we have con-
structed from the CPS. Since the CES is a broad employer-based survey with a large
sample size, it is likely to have less of a problem with sampling error in the wages. The
industry classiﬁcations for the two data sets are not exactly the same, but the nearest
20Table 4: The Regression with Time-Averaging.
I. Full sample: OLS
ν C
3.587*** (5.924) 10.298*** (4.621)
II. Full sample with instruments.
ν C
3.338*** (7.932) 8.477*** (6.035)
III. Younger workers.
ν C
3.172*** (6.211) 7.513*** (4.668)
IV. Older workers.
ν C
3.680*** (4.156) 12.715*** (4.114)
V. No college education.
ν C
5.160*** (2.763) 12.733*** (2.626)
VI. Some college education.
ν C
3.177*** (4.948) 8.367*** (3.926)
(T-statistics are in parentheses. One-tailed signiﬁcance: 1-percent***, 5-percent**,
10-percent*.)
21match produces quite similar wage series,11 and very similar regression results.12
We thus conclude that the high estimates of C and ν are not likely to be artifacts
of sampling error in wages.
5.2 Timing and the misinterpretation of ﬂow rates.
Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) point out a diﬃculty in interpreting ﬂow rates
that come out of the March CPS retrospective questions. Respondents are asked their
industry and occupation in their longest-held job of the previous year. If the duration
of jobs is distributed randomly and respondents remember correctly, on average they
will be reporting their employment status as of the middle of the previous year, and
thus mobility at a nine-month window (June to March) rather than a twelve-month
window. However, if a respondent has had more than one job during that year and
recalls the details of the later job more clearly, the later one might incorrectly be
reported as the longest job. In this case, the respondent might be reporting details of
his or her employment in October, for example, implying that what is being measured
is mobility at a six-month window.
Therefore, although it appears superﬁcially to be annual, the mobility measured
by the March CPS is something less than annual. Kambourov and Manovskii (2004)
point out that, consistent with this, occupational gross ﬂow rates as measured by the
March CPS tend to be smaller than those measured from other sources.
We can attempt to correct for this in the following way. Suppose that the gross
ﬂow rate we observe is the ﬂow rate over some interval that is K months long, and
denote the matrix of gross ﬂow rates thus observed by e m. We ﬁrst convert this into
a matrix of monthly gross ﬂows, ˆ m, by solving the equation ˆ mK = ˜ m, where ˆ mK
denotes the matrix ˆ m multiplied by itself K times.13 Without loss of clarity, we can
11The correlation between the two wage series is 63% for Agriculture/mining; 91% for Construc-
tion; 44% for Manufacturing; 56% for Transportation/Utilities; 61% for Trade; and 55% for Gov-
ernment and other services.
12For example, for the OLS regression in Table 3, the point estimate and t-statistic for ν are 4.466
(1.829) for the CPS wage data and 4.237 (2.031) for the CES data respectively. The estimates for
C are 22.065 (1.780) for the CPS wage data and 20.921 (2.021) for the CES data respectively.
13For example, in the two-industry case, if K = 2, the fraction of workers in industry 1 at the
beginning of the two-month interval who are in industry 2 at the end of the two-month interval is
22denote this matrix as ˜ m1/K = ˆ m. Suppose that within a year, the monthly ﬂow rate
matrix ˆ m is constant. Then the year-by-year matrix of ﬂow rates will be given by
mANN ≡ ˆ m12 = ˜ m
12
K , or the ˆ m matrix multiplied by itself 12 times. We have data on
gross ﬂow rates from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), which we
can denote m
ij,NLSY
t and which do not suﬀer from the timing problems just described










for the portion of our sample restricted to younger workers. This results in a value
of K = 5, implying that the March CPS measures mobility at a ﬁve-month horizon.
We then replace our measured gross ﬂows e m with the annualized gross ﬂows mANN =
e m12/K throughout, and perform the estimation again.
As expected, the annualized rates show higher gross ﬂows overall. Table 5 provides
a comparison of the original rates of gross ﬂow (meaning 1− e mii for i = 1,...6) with
the annualized rates of gross ﬂow (meaning 1 − (mANN)ii for i = 1,...6).
Table 5: Rates of gross ﬂow, original and annualized.







The regression results are as shown in Table 6. The ﬁrst two columns show results
from annualized data as just described, and comparing them with the results in Table
3 shows that, as expected, the values for C and ν are lower for each version of the re-
gression and for each subsample. The only exception is version IV, the regression with
equal to ˆ m12 ˆ m22 + ˆ m11 ˆ m12, which is the product of the ﬁrst row and the second column of the ˆ m
matrix.
14To clarify, (˜ m
12/K
t )ij is the ij element of the matrix mANN
t = ˜ m
12/K
t .
23only older workers; that sample shows a slight increase for the annualized regression,
but for neither the raw nor the annualized data are the coeﬃcients signiﬁcant. For
the other cases, the drop in the estimates of C and ν is substantial; for example, the
results from the benchmark regression (regression II) imply a mean moving cost of
about six and a half times average annual wages (compared with thirteen in Table 3)
and a standard deviation of moving costs of ﬁve times annual wages (compared with
seven times for Table 3). The ﬁnal two columns of Table 6 show the results of the
regression when we apply time-averaging as in the previous subsection to the annu-
alized data. Note the sharp reduction in estimates of C and ν, with the benchmark
regression showing average moving costs at just below three times average annual
wages. Note also that the coeﬃcients for older workers are now signiﬁcant, and that
throughout Table 6, the patterns of the basic regression are preserved: Instrumental
variables lower the estimated moving cost parameters, and moving costs are lower
for younger workers and workers with some college (the exception being the last two
rows of the last column).
Overall, we ﬁnd strong indications that the timing problem due to the nature
of CPS questions does bias our estimates for C and ν upward substantially, but
correcting for this still leaves large values for moving costs, with C never falling
substantially below three times average annual wages.
5.3 Mispeciﬁcation of moving costs.
A last possible source of bias comes from the fact that we have imposed uniform
moving costs for all sectors, so that Cij = C∀i,j. Degrees-of-freedom concerns prevent
us from estimating the full set of Cij parameters without restriction, but we have also
estimated the model with a slightly richer speciﬁcation allowing for sector-speciﬁc
“entry costs.” In this approach, Cij = cj for i = 1,...,6. Table 7 shows the results
of this regression with annualized data.
Compared with the benchmark regression (II) from Table 6, we ﬁnd that most
sectors exhibit lower entry costs (mostly between 4 and 5, compared to 6.6 for Table
6), but Sector 4, Transport, Communications and Utility exhibits substantially higher
entry costs — more than eight times average annual wages. This reﬂects the fact
that Sector 4’s wages are relatively high but few workers wind up in this sector. For
24Table 6: The Regression with Annualized Flow Rates.
Annualized ﬂows. Annualized with time-averaging.
I. Full sample: OLS
ν C ν C
2.178*** (3.755) 8.799*** (3.264) 1.857*** (9.982) 3.452*** (4.740)
II. Full sample with instruments.
ν C ν C
1.884*** (3.846) 6.565*** (3.381) 1.899*** (11.614) 2.837*** (4.300)
III. Younger workers.
ν C ν C
1.516*** (3.808) 4.988*** (3.011) 1.756*** (9.358) 2.296*** (3.313)
IV. Older workers.
ν C ν C
4.605 (0.504) 22.962 (0.502) 2.285*** (6.812) 5.640*** (4.893)
V. No college education.
ν C ν C
2.926* (1.405) 9.382 (1.261) 2.856*** (4.006) 4.037*** (2.351)
VI. Some college education.
ν C ν C
1.848** (1.938) 7.689* (1.499) 1.890*** (7.447) 2.969*** (2.984)
(T-statistics are in parentheses. One-tailed signiﬁcance: 1-percent***, 5-percent**,
10-percent*.)
25Table 7: Sector-speciﬁc entry costs.
Estimate. t-statistic.
ν 1.512*** (3.622)
C1 (Agriculture/Mining) 4.124 (1.053)
C2 (Construction) 4.899** (1.735)
C3 (Manufacturing) 4.994*** (3.165)
C4 (Transportation, Communication and Utilities) 8.311*** (3.044)
C5 (Trade) 3.703* (1.437)
C6 (Government and Other Services) 5.589*** (3.791)
(Full sample, with instruments. Gross ﬂows are annualized as in Table 6. One-tail
signiﬁcance: 1-percent***, 5-percent**, 10-percent*.))
example, from Table 2, note that wages for both Services and Sector 4 are about
ﬁve percent above the whole-sample average, but Sector 4 has fewer than a third as
many workers. Alternatively, note from a comparison of the fourth and sixth colums
of Table 1 that the rate of ﬂow from each other sector into sector 4 is in each case
around one third the rate of ﬂow into sector 6, despite that fact that on average the
wages in these two sectors are about identical. This indicates some implicit obstacle
(or disutility) to entering sector 4 compared to other sectors, thus implying a high
value of C4.
We can conclude that a portion of the reason for the high values estimated for
C in the earlier regressions is the need to account for the unusually low ﬂows into
Transport, Communications and Utilities. However, even when this eﬀect is separated
out, most of the other sectoral moving costs are still high — at least four times average
annual wages.
6 Simulation: A Sudden Trade Liberalization.
Now, we use the estimates to study the eﬀect of a hypothetical trade shock through
simulations. We assume that each of the six sectors has a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution production function, with labor and unmodelled sector-speciﬁc capital


















t is the output for sector i in period t, Ki is sector-i’s capital stock, and
αi > 0, ρi < 1, and ψi > 0 are parameters. Given the number of free parameters and
our treatment of capital as ﬁxed,15 we can without loss of generality set Ki = 1∀i.























t is the domestic price of the output of sector i. We set the values αi, ρi, and ψi
to minimize a loss function given our assumptions on prices (see below). Speciﬁcally,
for any set of parameter values, we can compute the predicted wage for each sector
and that sector’s predicted share of GDP using (13) and (12) together with empirical
employment levels for each sector and our assumptions about prices as described
below. The loss function is then the sum across sectors of the square of each sector’s
predicted wage minus mean wage in the data, plus the square of the sector’s predicted
minus its actual share of GDP. In addition, we assume that all workers have identical
Cobb-Douglas preferences, using consumption shares from the BLS consumer price
index calculations for the consumption weights. The parameter values that result
from this procedure are summarized in Table 8.
The moving-cost parameters used are found in our preferred speciﬁcation, the
annualized-ﬂow-rate approach of the ﬁrst two columns of Table 6, using the full
sample with instruments.
Then, to provide a simple trade shock, we assume the following: (i) Units are
chosen so that the domestic price of each good at date t = −1 is unity. (Given
our available free parameters, this is without loss of generality.) (ii) There are no
tariﬀs on any sector aside from manufacturing, at any date. (iii) The world price of
manufacturing output is 0.7 at each date. The world price of all other tradeable goods
15We assume that capital is ﬁxed in order to focus on the workers’ problem and to keep the model
manageable. Of course, capital should also be expected to adjust to trade liberalization, and that
should also be expected to aﬀect wages. We have experimented with simple simulations with perfect
capital mobility, obtaining similar welfare results but sharper movements in wages. We defer a full
treatment of this issue to future work.
27Table 8: Parameters for Simulation.
αi ρi ψi Consumer expenditure Pre-liberalization World
share. domestic price. price.
Agric/Min 0.691 0.6828 0.6733 0.07 1 1
Const 0.6544 0.4924 0.7653 0.3 1 1∗
Manuf 0.3224 0.3553 1.6965 0.3 1 0.7
Trans/Util 0.5721 0.5664 1.0393 0.08 1 1∗
Trade 0.5714 0.445 0.9125 0 1 1∗
Service 0.3418 0.5576 2.2135 0.25 1 1
(Note:∗ Under the second simulation speciﬁcation, the sectors marked with an asterisk
are non-traded, so they have no world price.)
is equal to unity at each date. (iv) There is initially a speciﬁc tariﬀ on manufactures
at the level 0.3 per unit, so that the domestic price of manufactures is equal to unity.
(v) Initially, this tariﬀ is expected to be permanent, and the economy is in the steady
state with that expectation. (vi) At date t = −1, however, after that period’s moving
decisions have been made, the government announces that the tariﬀ will be removed
beginning period t = 0 (so that the domestic price of manufactures will fall from
unity to 0.7 at that date), and that this liberalization will be permanent.
Thus, we simulate a sudden liberalization of the manufacturing sector. We com-
pute the perfect-foresight path of adjustment following the liberalization announce-
ment, until the economy has eﬀectively reached the new steady state. This requires
that each worker, taking the time path of wages in all sectors as given, optimally de-
cides at each date whether or not to switch sectors, taking into account that worker’s
own idiosyncratic shocks. This induces a time-path for the allocation of workers, and
therefore the time-path of wages, since the wage in each sector at each date is de-
termined by market clearing from (13) given the number of workers currently in the
sector. Of course, the time path of wages so generated must be the same as the time-
path each worker expects. It is shown in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007)
28that the equilibrium exists and is unique.16 The computation method is described at
length in Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (forthcoming).
We present two versions of the simulation. In the ﬁrst, all goods are assumed
to be traded, so all output prices are exogenous. In the second, some sectors are
non-traded, and so their prices are determined as part of the equilibrium.
6.1 Speciﬁcation I: All output is tradeable.
The results from the simulation with all goods tradeble can be seen in Figure 2, which
plots the fraction of the labor force in each of the six sectors at each date, and Figure
3, which plots the time-path of wages. Figure 4 shows the average payoﬀ V i
t to being
a worker in sector i at time t.
It is clear from Figure 2 that the employment share of manufacturing drops sharply
as a result of the liberalization, from an old steady state value of 25% to a new
steady state value of 16%, with corresponding modest gains to all other sectors.
This transition is substantially complete within 8 years. The loss of manufacturing’s
share is of course not surprising given that manufacturing has lost its protection. It
is also clear from Figure 3 that real wages in manufacturing fall as a result of the
liberalization, from an old steady-state value of 1.06 to a new steady-state value of
1.03, and with corresponding modest gains to all other sectors due to the drop in
consumer prices. It should be emphasized that in neither steady state are the wages
equalized across sectors. This is a basic feature of the gross-ﬂows model, absent
in net-ﬂows models (see Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) for an extended
discussion).
Figure 3 shows, in addition, that each sector sees a non-monotonic path for real
wages. The real wage in manufacturing overshoots its long-run value, with an initial
drop of 22% and a new steady state just 2.45% below the original steady state.
This overshooting occurs because after the sudden shock of the drop in domestic
manufacturing prices, workers begin to move out of the sector, moving up and to
the left along the sector’s demand-for-labor curve and gradually bringing wages up.17
16Strictly speaking, the proof there applies to the case with all goods traded, but it can be extended
mechanically to the case with non-traded goods under free trade.
17In principle, it is possible that this process could continue so that real wages in the liberalizing
29Similar overshooting occurs in each of the other sectors, in the opposite direction, for
parallel reasons.
Note that at each date following the liberalization announcement, the real wage
in manufacturing is below what it was in the old steady state. It would be tempting
to conclude that for this reason manufacturing workers must be worse oﬀ because
of the liberalization. However, that is not true. As can be seen in Figure 4, which
plots V i(Lt,st) from equation (3), all workers see a rise in their expected discounted
lifetime utilities at the time of the announcement, including manufacturing workers.18
The reason is the presence of gross ﬂows. Each manufacturing worker understands
that, because of the liberalization, manufacturing wages are permanently lower but
real wages in all other sectors are permanently higher. Further, there is in each
period a positive probability that the manufacturing worker will choose to move to
one of those other sectors and enjoy those higher wages. Taking into account these
probabilities, the manufacturing worker considers himself/herself lucky to be hit with
the liberalization.
Put diﬀerently, the liberalization lowers the wages in the manufacturing sector but
raises the option value to workers in the sector by more than enough to compensate.
Thus, in this case, despite the estimation of extremely high moving costs, the model
predicts that even workers in import-competing sectors will welcome liberalization.
This underlines the crucial importance of gross ﬂows in welfare analysis.19
Finally, we can compute trade ﬂows from the simulation. At each date with free
trade, GDP can be computed from the labor allocation and production functions;
from the utility function, we can compute consumption of each sector’s output, and
subtract the quantity produced to derive net imports. In the initial steady state with
the tariﬀ, calculation is slightly more complicated, as we need to add tariﬀ revenue
to income and compute consumption with domestic prices instead of world prices.
sector could rise past their original value, and wind up higher in the new steady-state than in the
old, but that does not happen in this case. See Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (forthcoming) for
examples.
18The rise in lifetime utility is between 4.5% and 5% in non-manufacturing sectors and 1.7% in
manufacturing.
19We also have simulated exactly the same policy experiment with the estimates from the sector-
speciﬁc “entry-cost” speciﬁcation of Table 7. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very
similar, with rather higher wages overall for Transporation, Communications and Utilities.
30Figure 5 shows the result for manufacturing output. At the date of liberalization,
manufacturing consumption jumps up because of the abrupt drop in the domestic
price of manufactures. Thereafter, it trends upward slightly because of increases
in GDP as the economy reallocates its labor. Throughout, domestic production of
manufactures falls, as workers leave the sector. Note that this implies that following
the liberalization, manufactures imports continue to rise for several years, even as
manufacturing wages rise. Thus, if one regressed manufacturing wages on import
penetration and the date t = −1 was not part of the data, one would ﬁnd a positive
coeﬃcient, while including the date t = −1 would change the sign to negative. This
suggests that regressions that relate current manufacturing wages to current import
penetration measures, such as are explored in Freeman and Katz (1991) and Kletzer
(2002), need to be interpreted with great care.
Another point can be seen regarding the interpretation of reduced-form regres-
sions. Revenga (1992), in her simplest speciﬁcation, regresses changes in log industry
wages and employment for the years 1981-5 on changes in log industry import prices
for the same period, and ﬁnds an elasticity of 1.74 for employment and 0.40 for wages.






































t denote the period-t manufacturing wage and domestic out-
put price, respectively. The employment ‘elasticity’ is analogous. The employment
‘elasticity’ from our simulation is 0.88, and the wage ‘elasticity’ is 0.38. Thus, the
orders of magnitude are similar to the Revenga elasticities and the signs match up
– despite the tremendous diﬀerences in method. However, as pointed out above, the
welfare implications of our dynamic model with gross ﬂows are the opposite of the
implications of Revenga’s static model without gross ﬂows. In her interpretation,
workers in a sector whose import price falls are hurt, while in our simulation they are
not. The option value eﬀects that are key to our analysis have no possible role in the
static approach.
Thus, although our model generates aggregate behavior broadly similar to what is
found in some reduced-form regression results, the welfare implications are extremely
diﬀerent.
316.2 Speciﬁcation II: Non-traded sectors.
In our second simulation speciﬁcation, Construction, Transportation/Utilities and
Trade are taken to be non-traded.20 Thus, their prices are endogenous, and adjust so
that the quantity produced in each of those sectors at each date (as determined from
the production function and the number of workers in the sector at that date) is equal
to the quantity demanded, given GDP and tradeable-goods prices. The endogenous
domestic prices are shown in Figure 11, which can be contrasted with the exogenous
prices of Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the reallocation of labor. Compared with Figure 2,
the pattern is similar, but the non-traded sectors expand less while the traded sectors
expand more. This is because the suddenly less expensive manufactured goods cause
consumer expenditure to switch toward manufacturing and away from non-traded
goods, eﬀectively shifting the demand curve for non-traded goods sharply downward
at the date of the liberalization. This is reﬂected in the sudden drop in non-traded
prices exhibited in the time-plot of domestic prices shown in Figure 11. As a result,
the movement in wages in non-traded sectors is much less sharp in Figure 8 than in
Figure 3. Figure 10 shows that, once again, liberalization increases the imports of
manufactures, with an initial jump and gradual adjustment over the following several
years.
The main point is unchanged. Real wages in manufacturing fall sharply and
never recover, as shown in Figure 8, but workers in manufacturing beneﬁt from the
liberalization along with workers in all of the other sectors, as shown in Figure 9.
Once again, the explanation is enhanced option value for workers in the liberalized
sector.
7 Conclusion.
We have presented a dynamic, rational expectations model of labor adjustment to
trade shocks, which is, through Euler-equation techniques, easy to estimate econo-
20This division is, of course, to some degree arbitrary. It is diﬃcult to argue that Services should
be classiﬁed as non-traded, since services trade has occupied much attention and created much
controversy at the WTO. On the other hand, the ‘Trade’ sector is, of course, mainly domestic
wholesale and retail trade, and thus not internationally traded, which is the meaning of ‘non-traded’
here.
32metrically, yielding structural parameters. It is then easy to simulate to study policy.
Among our ﬁndings are the following.
(i) Since gross ﬂows of workers across industries are substantial but do not respond
much to intersectoral wage diﬀerences, both the mean and the standard deviation of
workers’ moving costs implied by the model are large – several times an average
workers’ annual earnings, in fact.
(ii) Because of this, the model predicts somewhat sluggish reallocation of workers
following a trade liberalization. In our simulation of the elimination of a 30% tariﬀ
on manufacturing, 95% of the reallocation is completed in 8 years.
(iii) This implies sharp movement of wages in response to the liberalization, with
the short-run response overshooting the long-run response by a wide margin.
(iv) Option value, not previously part of the discussion in analysis of trade policy,
matters a great deal in evaluating the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. In our
simulation, the manufacturing wage falls both in the short run and in the long run,
but manufacturing workers are better oﬀ than before the liberalization because of
their enhanced option value. This echoes some ﬁndings by Magee, Davidson and
Matusz (2005) on patterns in political contributions.
(v) Although our model generates aggregate behavior broadly similar to what is
found in some reduced-form regression results, the welfare implications are extremely
diﬀerent.
A Appendix: Derivation of Equilibrium Condi-
tions with the Extreme Value Distribution.
A.1 Overview of the Derivation.
The cumulative distribution function for the extreme value distribution with zero
mean is given by:
F(ε) = exp(−exp(−ε/ν − γ)),
where γ ∼ = 0.5772 is Euler’s constant. The associated density function is:
f(ε) = (1/ν)exp(−ε/ν − γ − exp(−ε/ν − γ)).
33In the following subsection we will derive equation (6), which relates gross ﬂow
rates to the value function. In the subsection after that we will derive the form for
the option-value function reported in (7).
A.2 The mij function.
The gross ﬂow of workers from i to j at date t, m
ij
t , is equal to the probability that
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Given that εii ≡ 0, this yields (6).










(εj − Cij)exp(−εj/ν − γ − exp(−εj/ν − γ))
Q
k6=j exp(−exp(−[εj + εij − εik]/ν − γ))dεj
Going through the steps of Subsection (A.2), we ﬁnd:
35Ψij =
R
(ν(x − γ) − Cij)exp(−x − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
= (−Cij − νγ)exp(−λ) + ν
R
xexp(−x − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
= (−Cij − νγ)exp(−λ) + ν exp(−λ)
R
xexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
We know that exp(−λ) = mij from the previous derivation. Substituting this in:
Ψij = (−Cij − νγ)mij + νmij R
xexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
= (−Cij − νγ)mij + νmij R
xexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
+νmij R
λexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
−νmij R
λexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
= (−Cij − νγ)mij + νmij R
(x − λ)exp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
+νmij R
λexp(−x + λ − exp(−(x − λ)))dx
= (−Cij − νγ)mij + νmij R
y exp(−y − exp(−y))dy + νλmij R
exp(−y − exp(−y))dy
= (−Cij − νγ)mij + νmij R
y exp(−y − exp(−y))dy + νλmij.
Noting that
R
y exp(−y−exp(−y))dy = γ (Euler’s constant) (Patel, Kapadia and
Owen (1976, p. 35)), we can simplify:
Ψij = (−Cij − νγ)mij + νλmij + νγmij
= −Cijmij − ν log(mij)mij
= mij (−Cij − ν log(mij)).
36Adding this up across possible destinations j, note that the utility of a worker in













































































































This implies that the option value Ω(εi) can be written as:
Ω(ε








Alternatively, recalling that εii = 0, we have:
log(m






















This, then, is (7).
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